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Abstract 
This study embarked on a statistical analysis of the US counter-insurgency and counter-
narcotics efforts in relation to the overall process of state-building in Afghanistan. 
Compiling data from year 2006 to 2011, this study employed panel data analysis at the 
province level. While testing some of the widely held theories, this study found that 
insecurity—insurgent activity—is the main driving force behind poppy cultivation. This 
relationship is not dependent on whether insurgents get involved in the opium economy 
for financial gains. Furthermore, this study found that outside support for insurgents, in 
the sense of providing a safe haven, is the main exogenous causal factor that drives 
insurgency. In light of these findings, this study proposed a long-term regional policy that 
would be mindful of the complexities existing between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.  
  
CLARITY OR CONFUSION?: US POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN                            3 
Introduction 
The state-building process has turned Afghanistan into the land of metrics. 
Officials and their reports with inflated figures usually depict an Afghanistan on the right 
track towards prosperity. Even by the standard of metrics the real situation is gloomy. 
The number of improvised explosive devices (IED) 
targeting International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) rose to 3420 in 2009 from only 191 in 2004. 
The number of ISAF fatalities has consistently risen 
from 70 in 2002 to 566 in 2011, counting 1,900 
American soldiers with a price tag of $ $86,736.29 
million. The numbers for Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) and civilian deaths are in five digits, 
with reports varying by thousands.  
The Afghan Government and its international allies are in an “operational 
stalemate” where the core components of state-building, namely governance, 
reconstruction and economic development, are slowing down as the requirement for 
security and military forces in the face of increasing insecurity are speeding up. The 
resurgence of insurgency is a testimony to the deteriorating situation and the stalemate 
the Afghan Government and its international allies are facing. 
 Meanwhile the insurgency in the east and south along the border with Pakistan 
has turned into a complex and dynamic alliance with the Taliban at the core supported by 
militant groups operating from Pakistani territory. 5245 (71.47%) out of 7,338 IED 
attacks on ISAF personnel happened in eleven of the provinces bordering Pakistan.  
Figure 1: US Assistance to 
Afghanistan 
Source: Katzman (2012)  
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Similarly, 1,590 out of 2,200 ISAF fatalities between years 2001 and 2011 have 
happened in the provinces that share a border with Pakistan. 
The situation described here has become a norm for the Afghan political climate. 
For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been in a state of constant political unrest 
coupled with several regime changes. For every regime that came to grasp control, an 
insurgency ran parallel to it. 
Insurgents have received 
extensive support from foreign 
actors who claim a stake in the 
situation, specifically Pakistan 
serving as a sanctuary. 
During this period of 
turmoil, Afghanistan turned 
into a drug production hub. At least on the part of the governmental policy makers, 
national and international, it is 
a very popular and widely held 
theory that insurgents use the 
drug economy to finance their 
operations. Thus, tremendous 
attention is devoted to counter-
narcotics efforts. Although 
opium production levels have 
dropped since 2007, insurgency has gained strength. While 1,786 out of 2,200 ISAF 
Figure 3: Poppy Cultivation 1994-2011 
Source: UNODC (2011) 
Figure 2: Opium Production 1994-2011 
Source: UNODC (2011) 
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fatalities happened between 2008 and 2011, quite interestingly, 1,286 of these incidents 
happened in provinces that share border with Pakistan. 
A conglomeration of literature has evolved around the themes of insurgency, 
opium economy and their nexus, which retards the overall process of state-building. 
Nonetheless, the existing body of literature suffers from a deficiency of quantitative 
research. Most importantly, the effects of outside factors, i.e. sanctuary and outside 
support for insurgency, are usually discounted or marginal at best. While understanding 
that the situation in Afghanistan is very complicated and numerous factors are in play at 
different levels, this study aims to find and clarify simple causal relationships between 
the drug economy and insurgency. Thus, this study aims to accomplish two tasks: First, 
statistically test a few key propositions and theories pertaining to counter-drug and 
counter-insurgency efforts; second, emphasize and statistically assess the effect of 
exogenous factors in relation to these efforts. While embarking on any statistical effort 
pertaining to Afghanistan is a daunting task, given the scarcity of data available, this 
approach is justified by the need for an understanding of the interaction between the 
opium economy and insurgency in the context of state-building at a macro level. The 
results of such efforts would assist in evidence-backed policy formulation. 
Literature Review 
The conventional US counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency views consist of 
three elements: first, insurgents benefit from illicit economy; second, destruction of this 
illicit economy would cripple the financial basis of insurgents and is necessary to defeat 
the insurgency; and third, no distinction should be made between insurgents involved in 
the illicit economy and the criminals who participate in the illicit economy. These views 
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have resulted in the construction of the so called “holistic approach” to supply-side 
counter-narcotics policies, which nominally combines three elements; namely 
eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihood. The rationale behind such 
interventions is that a large-scale illicit economy hinders and distorts the political process 
in a state through corruption (Felbab-Brown, 2010).1 
A vast and rich conglomeration of literature pertaining to the formulation and 
implementation of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency policies in Afghanistan has 
evolved as these issues gain significance. Byrd (2008) reasons against the eradication 
component, listing three arguments: First, eradication is technically a difficult 
undertaking where opium economy is “footloose” taking in account time and space2; 
second, the political costs of eradication are very high; third, eradication does not address 
the deeper determinants of poppy cultivation, i.e. lack of physical and capital assets. Even 
though eradication achieves visible and quantifiable short-run results, it is not a 
sustainable approach to the problem of poppy cultivation.  
Felbab-Brown (2010) maintains that even if eradication efforts were highly 
successful—an assumption inconsistent with empirical evidence—they would only 
restrict one source of funding for insurgents; insurgents are capable of finding other 
sources.3 Where the highly emphasized approach of eradication has mostly been carried 
out under the leadership of provincial governors, there are serious concerns that 
                                                 
1 In Afghanistan, although it contributes on a large scale to local incomes, the drug trade’s illegality 
and related corruption and criminal activity threaten the institutions of state (Byrd, 2008). 
2 Kaufman (2009) explains, based on empirical evidence from eradication programs implemented by 
the United States (US) in some Asian and American countries, that eradication disperses cultivation to 
smaller plots scattered over larger terrain and eradication of these smaller plots is coupled with even more 
difficulties. 
3 Common alternative sources of income are from kidnappings, robbery, extortion and production of 
synthetic drugs. However, insurgents in Afghanistan have been able to make gains from development 
projects funded by Western donors. Read (Richter, 2010) for more details. 
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governor-led eradications are vulnerable to corruption due to close ties between local 
officials and opium economy (Byrd, 2008). 
Felbab-Brown (2010) postulates that eradication of illicit crops has not 
extensively weakened insurgencies; instead, forced and aggressive drug suppression has 
strengthened insurgencies (Felbab-Brown, 2010). Eradication of poppy crops puts 
farmers in serious debt, which provides incentives for them for re-cultivation (Byrd, 
2008; Durham, 2009; Mansfield & Pain, 2008). The cumulative debt and need for re-
cultivation, Felbab-Brown (2006) contends, strengthens the bond between farmers and 
insurgents. Since this alliance is mutually beneficial,4 it creates incentives for further 
cooperation between farmers and insurgents; eradication efforts face strong resistance 
from insurgents who protect the crops of their allied farmers (Blanchard, 2009). 
Challenging the conventional views on the nexus of illicit economy and 
insurgency—that insurgents can make only financial gains from the illicit economy and 
in turn use the money to enhance their military power— Felbab-Brown (2010) offers a 
more expanded explanation of this alliance. Her theory, political capital, suggests that 
involvement of insurgents in an illicit economy strengthens both their military and 
political capabilities. She further explains political capital consists of two broad 
components: First, legitimacy, i.e. the local residents believe that insurgent actions are 
“beneficial and justified”; second, popular support, i.e. local residents’ complicity with 
                                                 
4 According to Caulkins, Kleiman, & Kulick (2010), UNODC estimates an opium production of 7,000 
metric tons per year; thus, the estimated farm-gate revenue from opium sales would be $500 million per 
year and total net revenue for criminals (excluding farmers) would be $1.5 billion. The same amount is 
generated by smuggling this production to neighboring countries that makes it around $3 billion per year: 
equal to one quarter of licit Afghan GPD. 
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insurgency through provision of supplies, shelter and intelligence.5 In poor economies, 
the insurgents can gain extensive political capital through their positive involvement in 
illicit economy and the more labor-intensive the illicit economy, the more political capital 
the insurgents can generate. 
Mansfield and Pain (2008) believe that lack of security, economic growth and 
governance are the main causes of poppy cultivation; a fundamental failure in providing 
these factors explains the overall dependence on poppy cultivation. Lack of these factors 
has ravaged Afghanistan with endemic corruption. It is widely acknowledged that in the 
presence of such widespread corruption, poppy cultivation bans and eradication efforts 
have often served to consolidate the economic and political power of the individuals who 
exercise power in the region and are usually involved in the illicit economy (Byrd, 2008; 
Felbab-Brown, 2010; Giustozzi, 2007; Mansfield & Pain, 2008). Also, targeted 
eradication of poppy fields belonging to competing local elites by the corrupt Afghan 
officials agitate tribal elders, mostly along the Pashtun belt, and they join forces with the 
Taliban covertly or overtly (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
Felbab-Brown (2010) maintains that “eradication loses the battle for hearts and 
minds without fulfilling the promise of its siren song—cutting the belligerent off from 
resources.”6 Policies inspired by the present view of source-country counter-narcotics are 
effective in disrupting supply at most for two years (Felbab-Brown, 2010) before that 
                                                 
5 Felbab-Brown (2010) expands her theory, suggesting there are four main factors which contribute to 
the strength of insurgents in respect to an illicit economy: the state of overall economy; the character of an 
illicit economy; government response to the illicit economy; and presence of “thuggish traffickers.” The 
two first factors are the most important in explaining the political capital the insurgents can generate. 
6 Richard Holbrooke, the late U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, maintained that 
eradication was counter-productive to counter-insurgency: “It wasn’t just a waste of money… This was 
actually a benefit to the enemy. We were recruiting Taliban with our tax dollars.” (quoted in Felbab-Brown, 
2010,  p. 155) 
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supply recovers at the same place or relocates to some other location in the absence of 
reduction on the demand side (Byrd, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2010).7 
Brinkerhoff (2005) considers security a prerequisite for stabilization and progress 
toward normal political and economic activity. Security, provision of basic services and 
some economic opportunity are essential for a government to be considered legitimate. If 
a state does not or cannot provide basic services and some level of economic opportunity, 
then the citizens tend to withdraw support from the state. Concurrent with these 
assertions, Jones (2008) contends a government’s capacity to provide services to a 
population can change the outcome of a conflict in which insurgents contest for power. 
Brinkerhoff (2005) emphasizes the security factor in the credibility of a state and 
contends that a very important ability of a viable state is to have a “monopoly on coercion 
and the exercise of force; the state is repository of legitimate coercive power.”8 
Lister and Wilder (2005) argue that existence of a de jure state with several de 
facto governments within it distorts this ability of the state. Confirming rather than 
undermining the status of warlords9 who provide security, representation and welfare for 
                                                 
7 The Taliban ban by decree on 27 July 2000, which reduced the cultivation from 82,000 ha to 8,000 
nationwide and from 78,885 ha to 1,220 ha in the Taliban-controlled territory, is considered one of the most 
successful bans in the history. It is usually considered as a benchmark in counter-narcotics polices in 
Afghanistan (Mansfield & Pain, 2008). Yet, the ban did not have long-lasting and sustainable effect. 
Similar scenarios have happened in some individual provinces after the Taliban ban too. These bans have 
been followed by re-cultivation in subsequent years. Nangarhar is a good example of such provinces. At the 
time of writing their paper, Mansfield and Pain (2008) cast doubt that the first time ever poppy-free label of 
Nangarhar in 2008 would last longer. Indeed, the subsequent years saw a slow raise in levels of cultivation; 
2009 cultivation was 294 ha, 2010 was 719 ha, and in 2011Nangarhar produced 2,700 ha. 
8 Brinkerhoff (2005) also posits that when donors and humanitarian NGOs take the role of provider of 
essential service to the population it curtails the chances of a nascent government to expand its legitimacy 
through provision of services to populace. 
9 During extensive interviews, Lister and Wilder (2005) finds the still pending disarmament of 
warlords and their commanders by government and international community mentioned repeatedly as 
hurdles for effective authority of the de jure state. 
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the populace under their control is marginalizing the de jure state in its role and 
responsibility towards population.10 She argues that 
…the boundaries between the de jure and de facto states are not always clear [in 
Afghanistan]…some individuals are influential within both the de jure state and 
the de facto state. Indeed they owe their de jure positions to their de facto power. 
Moreover, they use their de facto powers to influence the de jure structures 
according to their interests, at both central and local levels (p. 41).11 
Jones (2008) analyzes 90 insurgencies since the Second World War and finds evidence 
harmonious with the assertions that the outcomes of an insurgency could be changed by 
fortifying the capabilities of indigenous security forces, especially police and quality of 
local governance. 
However, besides these indigenous factors, Jones (2008) finds some exogenous 
variables of prime importance pertaining to insurgencies and their outcome, namely: 
external support for insurgents and existence of a sanctuary. While counter-insurgency 
focuses on protecting the population and establishing a credible government through 
provision of security and isolating insurgents (Cassidy, 2010), external support and 
existence of a sanctuary for insurgents retard these objective drastically (Jones, 2008). 
While lack of security, economic growth and governance create a very suitable 
atmosphere for poppy cultivation (Mansfield & Pain, 2008), alternative livelihood in the 
                                                 
10 Read footnote number 8 above. 
11 A very good example of manipulation and interference of warlords in subnational governance could 
be explained by the control of four revenue producing districts of Faryab province by Jowzjan province, the 
home province of General Abdul Rashid Dostum. These four districts include the major carpet trading town 
of Andkhoi and Turkmenistan border customs post at Aqina. Whenever Dosutm is in power these four 
districts operationally come under the control of Jawzjan province and in his absence, for instance during 
the Taliban era, they are controlled by Faryab province (Lister & Wilder, 2005). 
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sense of providing farmers with better social and economic opportunities drive poppy 
cultivation down (Byrd, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Mansfield & Pain, 2008). Not only 
does eradication of poppy crops put farmers in serious debt, which creates incentives for 
re-cultivation, (Byrd, 2008; Durham, 2009; Mansfield & Pain, 2008), it strengthens the 
bond between farmers and insurgents, and creates incentives for them to cooperate with 
each other (Felbab-Brown, 2006). On the one hand this cooperation affords insurgents a 
chance to make financial gains by offering services to protect farmers’ livelihood—
poppy cultivation—on the other hand it earns them political capital—popular support and 
legitimacy (Felbab-Brown, 2010).12  
The ability of indigenous security forces to run a monopoly on the use of force, 
and the ability of state to offer effective governance enhance state’s legitimacy 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005; Jones, 2008). Provision of basic services and some economic 
opportunities is the driving wheel of government’s viability. Government’s incompetence 
to provide these basic needs causes the populace to withdraw support from government 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005; Jones, 2008). Moreover, external support and the existence of a 
sanctuary for insurgency makes it very resilient (Cassidy, 2010; Jones, 2008), corrupt 
officials agitate Pashtun tribal elders along the Pakistani border with targeted eradication 




                                                 
12 Since Afghanistan is in very poor economic condition and poppy cultivation is very labor intensive, 
insurgents should gain extensive political capital as the theory of political capital, advanced by Felbab-
Brown (2010), predicts. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Pertaining to Poppy Cultivation 
Positive involvement of insurgents in illicit economy saves crops from eradication 
and promotes cultivation; thus, 
1. Insurgency should increase poppy cultivation. 
Eradication in the absence of meaningful alternative livelihood is counter-
productive. It puts farmers in debt; hence, if a farmer’s crops were eradicated, he would 
re-cultivate next year; thus, 
2. Previous year’s eradication increases cultivation. 
Lack of social and economic development is among the main causes of poppy 
cultivation dependency; thus, 
3. Investments in social capital and physical capital such as education and 
development projects reduce poppy cultivation. 
Hypotheses Pertaining to Insurgency 
Eradication of poppy crops distances farmers from the government and brings 
them closer to insurgents; thus, 
4. Eradication of crops in the previous year strengthens insurgency. 
Insurgents make financial gains from their positive involvement in illicit 
economy. However, farmers need to harvest their poppy crop and sell the opiate before 
they could pay dues to their allied insurgents; thus, 
5. The previous year’s cultivation, in the sense of revenue, makes insurgency 
stronger. 
CLARITY OR CONFUSION?: US POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN                            13 
Since provision of basic services and economic opportunities establishes a 
government’s legitimacy, any services provided to the population and any development 
taking place should affect insurgency negatively; thus, 
6. Provision of services and development weakens insurgency. 
Foreign support and existence of a sanctuary make an insurgency resilient; thus, 
7. Provinces bordering Pakistan show higher levels of insurgent activity. 
Methods 
To test the hypotheses proposed above pertaining to determinants of insurgency 
and poppy cultivation, derived from the body of literature consulted for this study, two 
general models are constructed: 
1. Insurgency = β0+β1 Sanctuary+β2Poppy Cultivation of Previous Year (in 
the sense of revenue)+β3Poppy Eradication of Previous 
Year+β4Development (economic and social)+β5Government Services+u 
2. Poppy Cultivation = β0+β1Insurgency + β2Poppy Eradication of Pervious 
Year+ β3Development (economic and social)+ β4Government Services+u 
The analyses use province level data.13 Indicators for the variables to be included in the 
analyses were collected from various sources. Please refer to Annex A for a detailed 
discussion of the data. 
Collecting data for the indicators detailed included extraction of data from 
published reports and surveys. The results have been satisfactory enough to conduct some 
preliminary statistical analysis. Variables are operationalized as follows: 
                                                 
13 The first administrative division in Afghanistan is province. There are 34 provinces as of April 2004. 
Daykundi Province was established in March 2004 while Panjshir Province was announced in May of the 
same year. The second tire administrative division is district. Finding data at district level was not possible. 
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Insurgency: The best indicator to represent insurgent presence and activity—other 
than their actual number, strength etc.—is Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). This 
data was obtained from The Guardian online. Data have been constructed based on the 
Wikileaks database of Afghanistan warlogs from 2004 to2009. The records include only 
roadside bombs which exploded, and do not include person- or vehicle-borne suicide 
bombs.14 A total of 7,526 records are available out of which 188 of them were missing 
coordinates and could not be province-coded. Thus, only 7,338 valid records were 
extracted out of these data. The data was projected on the map of Afghanistan with 
administrative boundaries for its 34 provinces and the data was coded for the 
corresponding provinces. The geocoding process was done in ArcGIS software using the 
shapefile for administrative boundaries created by Afghanistan Information Management 
Services. The variable name is Exploded IEDs and the unit of measurement for this 
variable is total number of IED exploded in a year. 
Since IED data does not cover years beyond 2009, another indicator is used to 
capture insurgent activity in Afghanistan for years 2010 and 2011. This variable counts 
the number of coalition fatalities in Afghanistan. Data is obtained from icasualities.org, 
which has maintained records of coalition fatalities since the beginning of the war in 
Afghanistan. Out of the total 2,487 records for 2001-2011, 254 were missing province 
references so they were deleted. Out of 2,593 remaining records, 393 of them were 
reported to have happened of causes not related to “hostile” activity. It should be noted 
that coalition fatalities from hostile acts cannot capture the concept fully. There are not 
                                                 
14 Even though The Guardian provides summary figures for IEDs that were neutralized, it does not 
provide the detailed dataset. Follow this link for more information and to access the data 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/2010/jul/26/wikileaks-afghanistan-ied-attacks  
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always fatalities in all attempts made by insurgents. Nevertheless, icasualites.org does not 
provide a detailed record of the wounded. Furthermore, icasualities.org only records 
military fatalities; however, there are more foreign contractors than military personnel in 
Afghanistan—and most foreigners are considered legitimate targets by insurgents.15 For 
every soldier that is killed many more are wounded—IED and suicide attacks are the 
most common method of attacking coalition forces and explosions usually injure several 
while killing some. The same is true of the civilian fatalities. Thus, the number of 
fatalities of coalition soldiers is not a good indicator to capture the full extent of insurgent 
activity compared to IED incidents. This variable is named ISAF Fatalities measured in 
number of coalition fatalities in a year.  
Sanctuary: It is a widely accepted fact that Afghan insurgents have always had 
safe heavens in Pakistan, at least in FATA. Eleven out of thirty four provinces of 
Afghanistan share a border with Pakistan. This factor is represented in models by a 
dichotomous variable, Provinces Bordering Pakistan, coded 1 if the province has a 
shared border with Pakistan and 0 otherwise. 
Poppy Cultivation: Data are compiled from the annual Afghan Opium Survey 
published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of 
Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Data are available from year 2002 onwards. 
The variable name is Poppy Cultivation and unit of measurement is hectares (ha) of land 
cultivated with opium poppy crops in a year. 
                                                 
15 For instance, as of January 2012 there were 113,491 employees of defense contractors compared to 
90,000 American soldiers. Out of this number 25,287 i.e. 22 percent of them were American citizens—47 
percent Afghans and 31 percent from other countries. Military fatalities in year 2011 reported by 
icasualies.org were 418 American soldiers; however, the number of contractors exceeded it by 12 i.e. 430 
(Nordland, 2012).  
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Poppy Eradication: Data are compiled from the annual Afghan Opium Survey 
published by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Government of 
Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Some data are available from year 2003 with 
several missing cases. Data for year 2004 are not reported at all. Data are regularly 
reported from year 2005 onwards. This variable is included in the models as Poppy 
Eradication with unit of measurement of eradicated poppy fields measured in hectares 
(ha) of land in a year. 
Poppy Cultivation Lagged and Poppy Cultivation Lagged: These two variables 
are constructed by lagging the data one year. Poppy Cultivation Lagged indicates income 
that the insurgents gain from their involvement in opium trade while Poppy Eradication 
Lagged captures the notion that eradication leaves farmers indebted and creates 
incentives for re-cultivation and cooperation with insurgents. 
Electricity Consumer Units: This variable represents a development indicator in 
the models. Despite that electricity supply in Afghanistan does not very often extend to 
rural areas, this variable has consistent data from year 2003 to 2010 which makes a better 
choice, where other development indicators are not available. Data are obtained from 
Afghan Energy Information Center at http://www.afghaneic.org/. Da Afghanistan 
Breshna Sherkat (DABS). Da Afghanistan Breshana Moassassa now known as DABS has 
been privatized since May 2008 which is the national power utility provider; thus, it is a 
good indicator of services and development. DABS customers units include residential, 
commercial, governmental, industrial, NGO and holy places. This variable is named 
Electricity Consumer Units and its unit of measurement is number of electricity 
consumers units in a year. 
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National Solidarity Program: This variable corresponds to the number of 
“Community Development Plans” (CDP) which the National Solidarity Program (NSP) 
has completed through its “Facilitating Partners”. These partners include national and 
international organizations and companies that implement NSP projects. Similarly, data 
for year 2009 were extracted from 2009-09 National Status Report Sunbula 1388 (22 Aug 
to 22 Sep 09) which lacks data for the last three months of year 2009. Data for year 2010 
were retrieved from NSP- 3rd Quarterly Report (23rd Sep to 21st Dec, 2010) and data for 
2011 was extracted from NSP-3rd Quarterly Report (23rd September to 21st December 
2011). These data represent the cumulative number of CDPs completed by the date the 
reports were issued and are accessible at http://www.nspafghanistan.org/. While unit of 
measurement is cumulative number of CDPs completed by NSP in a year, this variable is 
represented as National Solidarity Program in the models. 
Government School Teachers: This variable is an indicator of government 
services and social development. Since education is freely provided for the populace by 
the Afghan Government, this variable precisely represents the intended causal variable in 
the model. Data are obtained from Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan at 
http://www.cso.gov.af/. Data are available for years 2008, 2009 and 2010. Data include 
total number of male and female government-employed teachers teaching at primary, 
secondary and high schools. Named Government School Teachers, this variable is 
measured in number of teachers on the Ministry of Education payroll in a year. 
Government School Students: This indicator intends to capture the idea of human 
capital development. Furthermore, it could measure the level of security. It often times 
happens that governmental schools are touched down by insurgents. Such incidents tend 
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to drawdown the number of students attending school. Data are obtained from Central 
Statistics Organization of Afghanistan at http://www.cso.gov.af/. Data are available for 
year 2010 only. It includes both male and female students at all three levels of schooling 
i.e. primary, secondary and high. The variable appears as Government School Students in 
the models and its unit of measurement is number of students enrolled into governmental 
schools in a year. 
Inconsistency and unavailability of data over consecutive periods of time for 
indicators do not permit compilation of a single and uniform dataset. With the data 
accessible, two datasets containing panel data and one dataset containing cross-sectional 
data were possible to put together. The first panel dataset would allow analysis over a 
period of four years, 2006-2009, with 136 records. The second panel dataset consisting of 
data for years 2009, 2010 and 2011 results in 102 records. 2010 is the year for which data 
are available for the highest number of variables, although with only 34 records 
corresponding to 34 provinces. 
Models 
To formulate these models, this study uses linear regression models with Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) estimators. 
Given the availability of data, the first dataset, which consists of panel data for 
years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, affords this study analysis of these four models: 
1. Insurgency: 
1.1.  Exploded IEDs = β0+β1Provinces Bordering Pakistan+β2Poppy 
Cultivation Lagged + β3Poppy Eradication Lagged+ β4Electricity 
Consumer Units+u 
CLARITY OR CONFUSION?: US POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN                            19 
1.2.  ISAF Fatalities = β0+β1Provinces Bordering Pakistan+ β2Poppy 
Cultivation Lagged + β3Poppy Eradication Lagged+ β4Electricity 
Consumer Units+u 
2. Poppy Cultivation 
2.1. Poppy Cultivation = β0+β1Exploded IEDs+β2Poppy Eradication 
Lagged+ β3Electricity Consumer Units+β4Provinces Bordering 
Pakistan+u 
2.2. Poppy Cultivation = β0+β1ISAF Fatalities+β2Poppy Eradication 
Lagged+ β3Electricity Consumer Units+β4Provinces Bordering 
Pakistan+u 
The reason two similar models are constructed for both insurgency and poppy 
cultivation is to compare the results from these pair of models pertaining to Exploded 
IEDs and ISAF Fatalities variables and see if ISAF Fatalities is a good indicator of 
insurgent activity. Data for the former is available only for years 2004-2009 where the 
latter has data available beyond year 2009. Analysis for years beyond 2009 would use 
this variable as indicator for insurgent presence and activity. 
The second dataset, with panel data for years 2009, 2010 and 2011, allows 
formulation of the following two models: 
3. ISAF Fatalities = β0+β1Provinces Bordering Pakistan+β2Poppy 
Cultivation Lagged +β3Poppy Eradication Lagged+β4National Solidarity 
Program+u 
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4. Poppy Cultivation = β0+β1ISAF Fatalities+β2Poppy Eradication 
Lagged+β3National Solidarity Program+β4Provinces Bordering 
Pakistan+u 
While the cross-sectional dataset for year 2010 makes statistical analysis possible 
in two models as: 
5. ISAF Fatalities = β0+β1Provinces Bordering Pakistan+β2Poppy 
Cultivation Lagged +β3Poppy Eradication Lagged +β4Electricity 
Consumer Units+β5National Solidarity Program+β6Government School 
Teachers Female+β7Government School Teachers Male + β8Government 
School Students Female+β9Government School Students Male+u 
6. Poppy Cultivation = β0+β1ISAF Fatalities+β2Poppy Eradication 
Lagged+β3Electricity Consumer Units+β4National Solidarity 
Program+β5Government School Teachers Female+β6Government School 
Teachers Male+β7Government School Students Female +β8Government 
School Students Male+β9Provinces Bordering Pakistan+u 
Results 
All models were tested for presence of heteroskedasticity and models 1, 2, 3 and 4 
produced positive evidence for presence of heteroskedasticity in the data (refer to Annex 
A for details). To account for this problem, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
estimators are used as a corrective measure for these four models (refer to Annex A for 
details). Models number 5 and 6 do not violate the homoskedasticity assumption; thus, no 
corrective method is applied. 
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Hypothesis 1 proposed that insurgents’ positive involvement in illicit economy is 
translated into protection of crops against eradication and it promotes cultivation. Thus, 
insurgency increases poppy cultivation positively. Four models i.e. 2.1, 2.2, 4 and 6 (see 
Annex B for estimations) provide statistically significant results to support the hypothesis 
that the presence of insurgency promotes poppy cultivation. While model 2.1 suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, poppy cultivation would increase by 48.5 hectares for each 
additional IED explosion, model 2.2 indicates that for each ISAF service member fatality 
in the theater, poppy cultivation increases by almost 463 hectares. The coefficient of 
ISAF Fatalities in Model 4 signifies that, holding constant all other variables, for each 
ISAF soldier killed in a hostile act, poppy cultivation increases by 254.18 hectares. 
Model 6 estimates an almost 200 hectares increase for each ISAF fatality, keeping other 
factors fixed. The mean of ISAF deaths caused by hostile acts between 2006 and 2011 is 
10 and mean of number of IEDs exploded between 2006 and 2009 is 50. Taking these 
averages into account, the presence of insurgent activity has effects of great magnitude on 
cultivation. These findings are in line with body of literature positing that lack of 
security—here indicated by presence of insurgent activity—is one of the main reasons 
farmers grow poppy (Byrd, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Mansfield & Pain, 2008). 
Hypothesis 2 postulated that eradication in the absence of a meaningful 
alternative livelihood compels farmers re-cultivate. The variable Poppy Eradication 
Lagged was incorporated into the models to test this proposition. None of the coefficients 
are statistically significant to support hypothesis 2. To further verify these findings 
additional models were estimated excluding the development indicators which further 
validated these findings (refer to Annex C for estimations of these models). These 
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findings are inconsistent with the body of literature which maintains that eradication in 
the absence of social and economic development compels farmers to re-cultivate (Byrd, 
2008; Durham, 2009; Mansfield & Pain, 2008). These findings, also cast partial doubt on 
political capital theory, as presented by Felbab-Brown (2010).  
Hypothesis 3 posited that social and economic developments reduce dependency 
of farmers on poppy cultivation. Based on availability of data, different models included 
different indicators. Models 2.1, 2.2 and 6 included supply of electricity to the population 
as an indicator of development. Where models 2.1 and 6 find no statistically significant 
relationship between electricity consumer units and levels of poppy cultivation, model 
2.2 indicates a statistically significant negative relationship. Keeping other factors 
constant, a one unit increase in Electricity Consumer Units is associated with a 0.033 
hectare decrease in poppy cultivation; 100 units would decrease 3.3 hectares in 
cultivation. The mean of electricity consumer units between years 2006 and 2010 is 
18,259 and consumer units increased on an average rate of 2,600 units between years 
2006 and 2010. Thus, the size and magnitude of this effect is very minimal. The direction 
of this finding meets expectations of the hypothesis. Although this impact is negligible, 
the general proposition holds. Knowing that often rural areas are not supplied with 
electricity and that poppy cultivation fields are usually in isolated rural areas, these 
results are not very unusual. However, to find all other development indicators 
statistically insignificant is very surprising. NSP, which is the linchpin of Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, is considered one of most successful programs to 
have reached and answered needs of population according to population’s proposed 
development plan. Furthermore, human development indicators—and in fact the widely 
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provided governmental service i.e. education measures—in model 6 show no statistical 
significance. These findings are incompatible with existing literature (Brinkerhoff, 2005; 
Byrd, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Jones, 2008; Mansfield & Pain, 2008) postulating that 
social and economic development reduces poppy cultivation. While this study falls short 
of any explanations for these findings, it highly recommends further careful investigation 
of these indicators with better and more data, if available along consistent years. 
The variable Provinces Bordering Pakistan was included in the models pertaining 
to determinants of poppy cultivation to assess the relationship of the bordering sanctuary 
with poppy cultivation. However, none of these models produced statistically significant 
results in any direction. Despite this, there is a statistically significant positive correlation 
between poppy cultivation and Provinces Bordering Pakistan. Table 1 in Annex D 
provides some of these statistics.16 
Hypothesis 4 maintained that eradication of poppy crops alienates farmers, 
consequently bringing them closer to insurgents. This cooperation makes insurgency 
stronger due to population’s complicity with insurgents. The variable Poppy Eradication 
Lagged was incorporated into the models to test this proposition. Only the coefficient in 
model 5 is statistically significant at the borderline confidence interval of 0.1%. A 100 
hectares increase in eradication of poppy fields has a ceteris paribus positive effect of 1.8 
on number of ISAF fatalities. The impact is of moderate magnitude considering the mean 
value of 272 for eradication between years 2005 to 2010. But if the poppy eradication and 
poppy cultivation figures are compared, this impact is negligible. Given the small number 
                                                 
16 Having presented these statistics, one should remember the mantra of statistics: correlation does not 
necessarily translate into causation. 
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of cases and borderline significance level, validity of this finding for any inference 
pertaining to hypothesis 4 is questionable. Thus, this study finds no compelling evidence 
to support the hypothesis which maintained that eradication would make the bond 
between farmers and insurgents stronger. These findings were further supported by 
estimating additional models excluding the development indicators (refer to Annex C). 
Another proposition this study considered is whether insurgents actively promote 
and engage in opium trade for financial gains. To answer this question, hypothesis 5, in 
line with conventional views on narco-insurgency, posited that insurgents get involved in 
drug economy for financial gains and use it to fund their operations. The insurgency 
models tested the effect of the previous year’s cultivation on insurgency, included in 
models as Poppy Cultivation Lagged. Only coefficients in model 1.2 and 5 are 
statistically significant; holding other factors fixed, an increase of 1,000 hectares in 
poppy cultivation is associated with 1 and 3 ISAF fatalities respectively. This positive 
relationship might not look substantial at the first glance; however, considering mean 
cultivation of 4,240 hectares between years 2005 and 2010, these small coefficients bear 
sizable impact. Evidence to back the hypothesis that Poppy Cultivation Lagged—in the 
sense of revenue from the previous year’s poppy harvest for insurgents—strengthens 
insurgency, lends partial support to any generalization. Two out of four models produced 
statistically significant results and one of these coefficients is significant at the borderline 
confidence interval of 0.1%. Whether insurgents make financial gains from their positive 
involvement in the drug economy requires further investigation. 
While hypothesis 6 maintained that social and economic developments and 
provision of services legitimize a government and consequently impede insurgency. 
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Based on availability of data, different models included different indicators. Models 1.1, 
1.2 and 5 included supply of electricity to population as an indicator of development. 
These three models indicate that, holding other factors fixed, an increase or decrease in 
the units of electricity consumers has no effect on insurgency. These results are 
statistically significant. One explanation for result from model 1.1 once again ties back to 
the nature of this development indicator; electricity is mostly provided to urban areas in 
Afghanistan. Model 1.1 used Exploded IED’s as its dependent variable and most of IED 
incidents take place along the highways connecting urban settlements. The second most 
probable place for IED activity is rural areas—with less population—where insurgents 
can plant these IED without being detected. The same operational factors could explain 
the results obtained from model 5; in year 2010 58.4% of total ISAF fatalities were 
caused by IEDs.  Model 5 also produced statistically significant results that an increase or 
decrease in number of female students attending government schools does not have any 
effect on insurgency, ceteris paribus. One plausible explanation is that most ISAF 
fatalities occur in rural areas, while a greater urban female population attends school. 
These results do not produce evidence in line with the expectations of the hypothesis. In 
fact, models 1.1, 1.2 and 5 indicate statistically significant results which estimate 
electricity supply and consumption—very good indicators of development and service 
provision, however only limited to urban areas in Afghanistan—do not have any effects 
on insurgency. These results are incompatible with existing literature (Brinkerhoff, 2005; 
Byrd, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Jones, 2008; Mansfield & Pain, 2008) which postulate 
that social and economic development would legitimize government and weaken 
insurgency. 
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While all the other hypotheses dealt with indigenous causal variables, hypothesis 
7 postulated that provinces that share border with Pakistan would show higher levels of 
insurgency. This assertion is based on the assumption that exogenous factors such as 
existence of outside support and sanctuaries make insurgencies resilient and exasperate 
complications that accompany counter-insurgency operations. Three out of four models 
(1.1, 1.2 and 5) devised to explain determinants of insurgency indicate statistically 
significant results to support this assertion. Model 1.1 estimates that provinces bordering 
Pakistan experience 56.58 more IED explosions compared to those provinces that do not 
share a border with Pakistan, holding all other factors fixed. Mean of IED explosions 
between years 2006-2009 is 50. Where model 1.2 shows statistically significant 
estimations that provinces bordering Pakistan are associated with 7.1 more ISAF member 
fatalities than those provinces that do not, model 5 indicates 13.1 for this relationship. 
The mean for ISAF Fatalities between years 2006-2011 is 10. Taking into consideration 
these means, the effect and size of these relationships are of importance. Table 2 in 
Annex D provides further statistics to illustrate this relationship. These findings 
concurrently support the proposition that support from outside and existence of a safe 
haven for insurgents make insurgency resilient and create hurdles for counter-insurgency 
efforts (Cassidy, 2010; Jones, 2008). 
Overall, the most consistent variable in the poppy cultivation models is 
insurgency, statistically significant in four out four models, represented either by 
Exploded IEDs or ISAF Fatalities. This provides ample statistical evidence in support to 
the hypothesis that presence of insurgents and their activity—which could be translated 
into lack of security—affects poppy cultivation positively. This relationship is not 
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conditional on their positive involvement in the opium economy. The second variable 
that consistently shows statistical significance in three out of four models pertaining to 
insurgency is Provinces Bordering Pakistan. This variable captures the concept that 
Pakistan serves as a sanctuary for the insurgency. These two relationships shed light on 
the causal mechanism at work; insurgency is the main determinant of poppy cultivation 
and existence of a sanctuary makes insurgency strong and resistant. 
What Is Past Is Prolog 
Political Turmoil, Insurgency and Foreign Actors 
The present chaotic situation in Afghanistan dates back almost 4 decades when 
King Zahir Shah was overthrown by Mohammad Daoud Khan, changing Afghanistan 
from a monarchy to a republic in 1973. This change disrupted one of the longest periods 
of political calm in Afghanistan’s turbulent modern political history, usually preyed upon 
by the players of the Great Game. This abrupt change was followed by a series of high-
rank assassinations and coups which resulted in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. 
As is the norm of international politics, these drastic developments in Afghanistan 
produced gains, losses and threatened geo-political and geo-strategic interests of players 
with stakes in the game; Pakistan was one of these stakeholders. From the very beginning 
of this political instability, Pakistan was wary of the nascent pro-Soviet regime of Daoud 
Khan. Pakistan’s discomfort with Daoud Khan could be traced back to 1953 when he 
became the Royal Prime Minister and his foreign policy pursued the Pashtunistan17 issue 
                                                 
17 Pashtunistan is a Pashtun nationalistic idea which to Afghan advocates usually translates into the 
abolition of British-demarcated Durand line of 1893. It is an idea of re-claiming the territories that 
Afghanistan ceded to British India which is now part of Pakistani territory.  
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as its top priority. To complicate matters for Pakistan, Afghanistan developed closer 
relationships with India—the rival neighbor which has always kept Pakistan on its toes. 
Daoud’s obsession with the Pashtunistan issue played a major role in his forced 
resignation in 1963 (US, 2011).18 A decade later Daoud Khan, overthrowing the king 
through a coup, returned to power as a president and it alarmed Pakistan. One of the long-
term remedies Pakistan sought to alleviate its problems was providing shelter for the 
oppositions of the Afghan government. When Daoud crushed a nascent Islamic 
fundamentalist movement in 1975, Pakistan welcomed these Islamic leaders—Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and others—and settled them in Peshawar where they 
received assistance from the Pakistani government to continue their opposition against 
the Afghan state. 
In the aftermath of Daoud Khan’s assassination in April of 1978 and the 
subsequent volatile political climate, the Russian Army marched on Kabul in December 
of 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan soon turned Pakistan into the anti-
communist hub that welcomed, without discrimination, all who sought an end to the 
communist expansion. The Afghan opposition Islamic leaders, who had escaped to 
Pakistan in 1975, declared jihad against the Soviet invasion and the pro-Soviet 
government of Afghanistan. These mujahedin groups started launching attacks on targets 
in Afghanistan infiltrating through the open tribal belts which forms the Afghan-Pakistan 
border areas. The United Sates (US) endowed itself to the cause of communist 
containment by encouraging and supporting the government of Pakistan to deal with the 
situation at hand. The government of Pakistan used Islamic rhetoric, invoking the Muslim 
                                                 
18 Access http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/26.htm for more information on this subject. 
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world to join the sacred jihad against the Soviet in Afghanistan. This effort brought 
Muslims from all over the world to Pakistan, including some future top leaders of Al 
Qaeda. 
The invasion ended with the United Nations sponsored Geneva negotiations in 
1988 which resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan by mid-
February 1989. However, this did not bring peace to Afghanistan. In 1992, the last pro-
Soviet regime collapsed into the hands of the mujahedin, under whose leadership 
Afghanistan fell victim to sectarian, regional and ethnic conflicts. Although the collapse 
of the pro-soviet regime in Afghanistan mitigated to a great extent what had started as a 
pronounced threat to the geo-strategic interests of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, the instability 
and control of regions of Afghanistan by different factions still posed looming problems. 
These threats were realized in light of the fact that Afghanistan now served both a geo-
economic and a geo-strategic purpose in the context of Pakistan’s Central Asia policy, i.e. 
access to Central Asian markets and strategic depth vis-à-vis India (Maass, 1999). 
Pakistan pursued both of these objectives by injecting the Taliban into the Afghan 
political arena. In fall of 1994, the Pakistani-backed Taliban movement made their way 
into Afghanistan.19 After consolidating their power in Kandahar, the Taliban gained 
control of Herat in September 1995 and one year later moved on to Kabul. By 2000, the 
Taliban controlled more than 90% of Afghanistan’s territory. 
Through its support to the Taliban, Pakistan dismantled the network of warlord-
erected check points which harassed Pakistani truckers on trade routes to and transiting 
                                                 
19 When the Taliban launched their assault on the town of Spin Boldak in early fall 1994, a Pakistani 
“artillery barrage” helped them advance into the area (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
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through Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan realized its desire to install a pro-Pakistani 
government in Afghanistan which would distance itself from India, Iran and Russia. 
These actions insured Pakistan’s strategic depth in any possible military confrontation 
with India.20 In response to the Taliban’s regime, the nonPashtun mujahedin groups 
formed the Northern Alliance with the foreign backing of Russia, Iran, India and the 
United States (Felbab-Brown, 2010).21 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States, together with a coalition of 
the willing, intervened in Afghanistan by initially providing support to the Northern 
Alliance. The elimination of the Al Qaeda network, whose leadership and operatives 
were active in their sanctuary in Afghanistan, was the primary objective of post-
9/11intervention. By December 2001, the Taliban—never the main objective—were 
dismantled in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives, together with their Taliban allies, were 
“shoved east” and south into Pakistan. To make sure they did not return to their sanctuary 
in Afghanistan, a stable Afghanistan was envisioned. An international conference in 
December 2001 laid blueprints of the post-Taliban Afghanistan, resulting in the creation 
of the ISAF from the countries termed as the coalition of the willing, soon led by North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (Felbab-Brown, 2010).  
No consideration was given to how the border with Pakistan—around 2,500 
kilometers of rough terrain—would effectively be closed to infiltration of Al Qaeda and 
their affiliates. The fact that the lawlessness of Pashtun tribes in the Federally 
Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) is accepted and tolerated by Islamabad complicated 
                                                 
20 Read (Durrani, 2011) for a short and an interesting discussion of this subject.  
21 Since the Taliban received financial and military support from Pakistan, this basically echoed a 
struggle for regional dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan’s proxy control of Afghanistan. 
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this issue. They are a strategic assets Islamabad wants to keep intact because they can be 
used to serve Pakistan’s interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan (deVillafranca, 2008). A 
good example of these Pakistani interests pertaining to Kashmir is the creation and 
support of the Lashkar-e Taiba group, which now poses perhaps the biggest threat to 
Western targets in South Asia.22 
Up until 2005, Islamabad bluntly denied the presence of any Taliban in Pakistan 
even in the tribal belt. No Taliban leaders were captured in Pakistan yet the US-Pakistani 
relations—very well signified by the inflow of the US military and economic aid to 
Pakistan—followed its normal pace in the face of occasional arrests of Al Qaeda leaders. 
British Prime Minister David Cameron on July 28, 2010 firmly stated that, 
We cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country [Pakistan] is allowed to 
look both ways and is able in any way to promote the export of terror, whether to 
India or whether to Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world…It is not right…to 
have any relationship with groups that are promoting terror. Democratic states 
that want to be part of the developed world cannot do that (Watt & Dodd, 2010). 
                                                 
22 State sponsor for jihad in Kashmir gave Lashkar-e Taiba extensive access to resources to establish 
its infrastructure. Since it has no allies and is prone to state pressure, it refrains from attacks on the 
Pakistani state. Unlike the Deobandi—a movement of Sunni Muslims following teachings of the Hanafi 
School—militant groups, Lashkar-e Taiba had no connections with the Taliban government in Afghanistan 
and refrained to cooperate with them after 9/11. However, by 2006 after their activities were restrained in 
Kashmir, they started sending militants to Kunar in Afghanistan. Lashkar-e Taiba is on the list of State 
Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and is officially banned in Pakistan. However, it has 
maintained a very close working relationship with both the Pakistani army and ISI. The US military and 
ISAF officials admit that Lashkar-e Taiba has the most effective fighters in the region. It attacks Western 
targets in South Asia, serves as trainer and facilitator to other organizations such as Al Qaeda to attack 
Western countries. Since they attract a lot of want-to-be Western jihadists to train for attacks in Western 
countries, Lashkar-e Taiba has become an ideal global jihadist facilitator (Tankel, 2010). Recently, the 
United States announced a $10 million reward for information leading to capture of Hafiz Saeed, founder 
of Lashkar-e Taiba who now leads the Jammat-ud-Dawa  group. A day after the announcement of the 
bounty, Saeed appeared at a press conference and said that he was neither a fugitive from neither the US 
nor a hiding in the mountains. He mentioned that he was on his way to Lahore tomorrow and the US could 
contact him whenever it wanted. 
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But such statements, which are usually timed to appease a particular audience,23 generally 
fall on deaf ears demonstrated by lack of inaction on the part of the stakeholders, 
especially the United States. 
The Pakistani complicity clearly makes a case for a thorough rethink of the state-
building strategy in Afghanistan because it is known for a fact that insurgencies that 
enjoy a safe haven are almost impossible to defeat. Despite the deteriorating situation in 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, no major change in the US policy for Pakistan has 
taken place (deVillafranca, 2008), other than the intensified drone strikes inside Pakistani 
territory which has agitated the Pakistani civilian and military officials, not to mention 
outraged the general public. 
The Nexus of Insurgency with Illicit Economy (Mujahedin to Warlords and 
Emergence of the Taliban) 
The mujahedin groups, who fought against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, 
financed part of their operations by the revenue from poppy opium which was cultivated 
in Afghanistan and refined in labs in Pakistan.24 Soon a vast network of producers, 
traffickers and buyers established themselves, including the two secret agencies, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
(Kreutzmann, 2007). Trucks belonging to the National Logistics Cell of the Pakistani 
Army would transport CIA-supplied weapons from Karachi ports to Afghanistan and 
return with loads of opiate which securely passed through police check points with ISI 
documents exempting them from being searched (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
                                                 
23 This speech was delivered to the Indian business leaders in a trade summit in India.  
24 Significant sources of finances were donations from Islamic countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and 
financial aid from Western countries especially the United States. 
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The mujahedin groups got heavily involved in the opium business and encouraged 
populations under their control in east and south of Afghanistan to grow poppies.25 
Meanwhile they received extensive aid from both the ISI and CIA until end of 1980s 
(Felbab-Brown, 2010). When the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan, the US aid 
appropriated to the mujahedin dropped drastically. These groups needed income to keep 
and pay their fighters; thus, they expanded the illicit sources of income, opium trade 
being the most favored (Kreutzmann, 2007).26 Between 1979 and 1989 the opium 
production in Afghanistan raised from just 200 tons to 1,200 tons which marked the 
beginning of a narco-economy there. In 1994 the production of 3,400 metric tons of 
opium was 17-fold the production level fifteen years before. This trend of cultivation and 
production intensified under the Taliban when they formally started taxing drug activities 
and gained full control of the opiate business. 
Illicit Economy 
Before the 1970s, opium was produced traditionally on a very small scale for 
local or regional consumption; the involvement of the mujahedin in drug trade expanded 
it, turning Afghanistan into a major opium producer by the mid-1980s, as detailed above 
                                                 
25 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mullah Nasim Akhundzada and Ismat Muslim were some of first mujahedin 
leaders to get involved in drug trade. Akhundzada established his dominance in Helmand Valley using drug 
money to expand his army.25 Ismat Muslim from the Achekzai tribe emerged as the warlord involved in the 
drug trafficking in 1979 and over a drug-related dispute with the ISI defected to the government of 
Afghanistan and became part of the militia forces (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
26 While Hekmatyar received the highest amounts of aid from both ISI and CIA until end of 1980s, he 
got heavily involved in drug trade when he could not pocket foreign aid anymore. Similarly, after the 
failure of Mohammad Najubullah government in 1992 Afghanistan came under the control of these 
mujahedin groups. Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani controlled the trafficking routes to 
Tajikistan and Iran through which trucks loaded with opium would go, and come back carrying cash and 
weapons. On a similar account, Haji Abdul Qadir from the Arsala clan became the kingpin of illicit 
economy in Nangarhar, involved both in drug trade and smuggling of legal goods brought from Dubai to 
Pakistan. Arsala family’s effective control of Jalalabad and its airport made it very convenient to air 
transport goods from Dubai to Jalalabad and then smuggle them to Pakistan (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
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(Byrd, 2008). Cultivation and production kept their pace during the Taliban regime and 
turned Afghanistan into the heart of the Golden Crescent production hub.27 Despite the 
counter-narcotics efforts in the  post-Taliban Afghanistan, poppy cultivation and opium 
production have maintained pace and even regained momentum in 2011(Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate these in the introduction section above). 
Laissez-faire to counter-drug in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The Afghan 
Interim Authority banned poppy cultivation, processing and trafficking, and consumption 
of opium and related products by issuance of a decree in January 2002 (Felbab-Brown, 
2010). Nonetheless, the US did not consider curtailing the illicit economy and drug trade 
as part of its operations in the initial two years of the campaign in Afghanistan. The Bush 
administration prioritized stability in Afghanistan as its objective at the expense of the 
process of state-building (Giustozzi, 2007). This included a laissez faire approach to 
illicit economy, empowering warlords and hiring their militia as security forces.28 Due to 
this operational compromise, the US was unwilling to tackle the illicit economy and 
people involved in this vast network. Many of the US-friendly local commanders who 
provided intelligence and militia to hunt down Al Qaeda and the Taliban were deeply 
involved in the illicit economy. A diplomat in Kabul said that “without money from 
drugs, our friendly warlords can't pay their militias...It's as simple as that" (McGirk, 
2003). These compromises drastically hammered the disarmament, demobilization and 
                                                 
27 Golden Crescent expands on the territories of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan and the productions 
from this hub usually are trafficked through the Balkans to European markets. 
28 In the years 2001-02 the CIA and Special Forces officers distributed $70 million in cash to warlords 
such as Ismail Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Ustad Atta Mohammed, Gul Agha 
Sherzai and Hazrat Ali to hunt down the Taliban and al Qaeda. These individuals expanded their militia 
who were hired as security personnel and reaped huge financial benefits in subsequent years. These 
warlords found their way into high governmental posts while still maintaining their ties to the regional 
networks of illicit economy (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
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reintegration (DDR) process—a core component of state-building—which began as the 
Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program in April 2003 and ended in July 2005.29 
Neglecting to tackle the illicit economy brought the US under a lot of criticism at 
home and abroad. Consequently, the US revised its policy in 2004 from a laissez-faire 
approach to a policy committed to uprooting the drug trade (Felbab-Brown, 2010).30 The 
anti-drug efforts and rhetoric were intensified in the following years.31 The US asserts 
that there is a strong nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism, posing a significant 
transitional threat that undermines “Afghan economic and governance development and 
the stability of the broader region that are of importance to the United States interests.” 
Moreover it considered drug use a serious threat stating that “drug use endangers health 
                                                 
29 The program was laid out to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate 100,000 Afghan militia forces with 
an initial completion date before the first presidential elections in June 2004. By June 2004 however, only 
10,000 individuals had gone through the DDR process and the target figure was reduced to 40,000 from the 
original 100,000 (Lister & Wilder, 2005). At the end of the DDR program in July 2005 an estimated 1,800 
armed groups consisting of around 100,000 individuals were still present in country (Lister, 2009). The 
Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program webpage accessed at http://www.anbp.af.undp.org/introduction-
to-anbp/ on 03/18/2012 indicates the end date of program June 2005 with the achievements indicating that 
“93,260 names were removed from the [Ministry of Defense] payroll, allowing a budget saving of over 
$120 million; Disarmed 63,380 former officers and soldiers; Decommissioned 259 units; 53,145 ex-
combatants selected the reintegration option, 53,054 ex-combatants completed the reintegration training; 
90% are employed; 94,262 light and medium weapons as well as 12,248 heavy weapons were collected; 
56,163 weapons destroyed.” 
30 This change in the US policy translated into some major events in Afghanistan: In December of 
2004 Karzai declared jihad against poppies at a major counter-narcotics policy conference in Kabul, soon 
the Counter Narcotics Directorate was upgraded to Counter Narcotics Ministry while Afghanistan’s 
National council of Ulema issued a fatwa declaring cultivation and trade of opium haram (Felbab-Brown, 
2010). 
31 In 2005 the implementation of Afghan anti-drug strategy was issued which the Bush administration 
revised in 2007. This strategy consists of five elements also known as the Five Pillars Plan. The first pillar 
is Public Information that aims to raise awareness about the dangers of narcotics business in public through 
meetings with locals and tribal leaders. The second pillar is Judicial Reform; the Criminal Justice Task 
Force under presidential decree to bring in corrupt officials and high profile traffickers. The third is 
Alternative Livelihood Development that provides different alternatives to formers who agree not to 
cultivate poppy. The forth pillar is Interdiction under which the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) initiated Operation Containment in early 2002 in Afghanistan and neighboring 
countries that now has extend to 19 countries in the region. Fifth, and the most emphasized, pillar of the 
strategy is Eradication (Blanchard, 2009). Out of the $2504.9 million spent on counter-narcotics efforts 
between 2005-2009 fiscal years in Afghanistan, $992.2 million has been spent on eradication and $966.3 
million on interdiction activities. Rule of law/justice has been allocated $382.5 million, public information 
$35.4 where drug demand reduction has been allotted $17.6 million (GAO, 2010).  
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and safety of every American, depletes financial and human resources, and deadens the 
spirit of our communities”32 (ONDCP, 2010). Considering that the United States and 
Canada consumed 22 tons i.e. 6% of the overall heroin produced in year 2008 and 17-20 
tons of it possibly originated from Afghanistan, listing Afghanistan drugs as a threat to 
Americans was justified.33 Nonetheless, it is not the United States that is grossly affected 
by narcotics produced in the Golden Crescent hub. Europe (with the exception of Russia 
and Turkey) consumed 88 tons i.e. 26% and the Russian Federation consumed 70 tons i.e. 
21% of the 2008 heroin produced by Afghanistan and its neighbors (UNDCP, 2009). 
Afghan Heroin kills 100,000 people around the world each year and in Russia alone 
30,000 youth die due to this killer plague (Pyatakov, 2010). These high drug demands 
coupled with the extreme mortality rates due to drug abuse put the United States—which 
is in-charge of the counter narcotics efforts in Afghanistan—under pronounced pressure 
from its European allies. Furthermore, Russia has pleaded the US to take firm and 
effective counter-narcotics action in Afghanistan.  
 Afghanistan produces an estimated 90 percent of global and 95 percent of the 
European market needs. The income from this production is estimated to constitute more 
than one-third of the overall Afghan economy which is equal to more than half of the licit 
GDP (Felbab-Brown, 2010). The fact that illicit economy has penetrated the political and 
economic system of Afghanistan is widely recognized (Mansfield & Pain, 2008). The 
                                                 
32 The corresponding measure has targeted both aspects of the drug market i.e. supply hubs globally 
and demand reduction domestically. However the supply-side reduction has been more emphasized lately. 
Looking at the budget allocation for the drug control funding from 2002-2005 fiscal years, the supply 
reduction components of the budget are above 54% of the total budget; since 2005 they are above 62% for 
all subsequent fiscal years (ONDCP, 2010). 
33 Caulkins, Kleiman and Kulick (2010) contend that the U.S. should not consider the Afghan counter-
narcotics policies as having any effect on the U.S. heroin use. Afghanistan has no comparative advantage 
over the Columbian and Mexican markets in the United States. 
CLARITY OR CONFUSION?: US POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN                            37 
pyramidal hierarchy consists of only a few dozen key traffickers at the top who are 
collaborators with warlords, government officials and figures involved in the politics of 
Afghanistan (Byrd, 2008). While taking any action against these highly connected 
players accompany huge political costs, not brining any significant blow to this driving 
mechanism would undermine any other development efforts, especially the counter-
narcotics. 
This historical account of insurgency, foreign support to these insurgencies and 
the parallel expansion of the illicit economy with the involvement of insurgent groups 
demonstrated several key points concurrent with the overall arguments presented in this 
study. 
First, Pakistan has historically served and is still serving as a sanctuary where 
Afghan insurgents are sponsored overtly and covertly by Pakistan. This sanctuary not 
only provides a safe haven for Afghan insurgents but to all who wish to take part in jihad 
against nonMuslim invaders. During the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, support to the 
Afghan mujahedin in their fight against the Soviet Army and letting Muslim jihadists 
operate in the region turned  Pakistan into a hub of Islamic fighters. Subsequent creation 
of the Taliban by ISI to get rid of the mujahedin groups in Afghanistan and supporting 
the rebels in Kashmir, who carry terrorist attacks in Indian, have slowly magnified and 
expanded operations from this hub (Tkacik, 2010). 
Second, these fighters and insurgents have and still use illicit economy, in 
particular opium trade, as one of the sources of revenue to finance their operations. 
Although the drug trade has expanded greatly when insurgency has grown stronger, it has 
not been the only source of revenue for them. Extortion of the populace, warlord 
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checkpoints on the highways and smuggling of licit goods have also been methods used 
by belligerents to generate revenue. Thus, going after poppy fields has been confusing 
causality with correlation on the part of policy makers who assume that curtailing the 
opium economy would bring a big blow to the insurgency. It is insecurity—in the form of 
the presence of insurgents—which promotes poppy cultivation where sanctuaries allow 
insurgents to recover, regroup and re-launch. A glimpse of the past four decade history of 
Afghanistan stands testimony to these assertions. 
Implications and Conclusions 
While scholarly literature is full of plausible suggestion in all different 
dimensions of counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics and the overall scheme of state-
building in Afghanistan, this study resulted in statistical evidence in line with the body of 
literature which posits security a pre-requisite for any development initiative to work 
effectively. No binding statistical results were produced to support that development 
reduced poppy cultivation or insurgency. Better and consistent data for indicators are 
needed to assess these relationships. 
Nevertheless, this study found that insecurity—insurgent activity—is the main 
driving force behind poppy cultivation. This relation is not dependent on whether 
insurgents get involved in the opium economy for financial gains. 
There are several factors which undermine security in Afghanistan. As far as 
endogenous causal variables are concerned, the existence of de facto states within the de 
jure state—as warlords and their militia roam every corner and quarter of the country—is 
one of the factors. This study fell short to account for this variable in its statistical models 
because no data are available on the number of warlords, their militia and geographical 
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limits of their operation. Similarly, data pertaining to number of ANFS and ISAF at the 
province level are not disclosed; thus, an important security indicator has not been 
accounted for. 
However, the models could account for a major exogenous factor which affects 
the security situation inside Afghanistan substantially; provinces bordering Pakistan are 
the areas of activity where insurgents effectively operate against collation force. From the 
historical context, it is understood that Pakistan has always projected a cynical attitude 
toward any Afghan government which has undermined Pakistan’s geo-strategic and geo-
economic interests. To undermine these governments, Pakistan has and still serves as a 
sanctuary for Afghan insurgents. This sanctuary complicates the counter-insurgency 
efforts greatly. 
The situation in Afghanistan demonstrates that history repeats itself, with some 
minor variations. The emergence of this jihadist hub traces back to the era of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. The mujahedin groups that the US, Arab countries and Pakistan 
financed and buttressed are still operational. Good examples are the renowned Haqqani 
and Hekmatyar fighters. The only aspect different in the present episode is that they are 
up against the West instead of the Soviet Army. The fighters are the same; the sanctuary 
is the same; the same network of support exists. Only some allies from the old days are 
now on the other side of the line. Thus, the United States and its coalition of the willing 
know that the most important part to the Afghan conflict lies in Pakistan. As long as this 
sanctuary exists, the insurgency continues. The persistence and patience of the 
insurgency cannot be captured better with anything else than by the Taliban mantra: 
Americans have all the watches but we have all the time. 
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The US polices so far have lacked a long-term regional geo-strategic scheme; 
these policies have been reactionary in nature rather than shaping the developments in the 
region. The US should be mindful of Indo-Afghan-Pakistani relations.34 Any policy 
should try to mitigate these frictions, alleviate the fears Pakistan has for Indo-Afghan 
relationships and commit to a long-term regional policy in the region. 
As deVillafranca (2008) maintains “…the insurgency is a little like an 
overflowing sink: We can use more and more rags to mop up the overflow, or we can try 
to figure out how to turn off the tap” (p. 90). Pakistan is the tap and a long-term regional 
policy is the method to turn it off.  
                                                 
34 The Kashmir dispute between Indian and Pakistan is one of the main reasons Pakistan needs to 
maintain Islamic jihadist groups and resort to an Islamic rhetoric. 
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Annex A 
Results of Heteroskedasticity Tests: 
Models   The Breusch-Pagan Test Koenker Test 
1.1, 1.2, 2.1 & 2.2  544.223 significant at 0.01 43.178 significant at 0.01 
3 & 4   30.764 significant at 0.01 14.828 significant at 0.01 
5 & 6   Did not test significant Did not test significant 
 
To employ a corrective measure, this study used the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error estimators in OLS regression models. This procedure was done through the 
macro developed by Hayes and Cai (2007). Value “3” was assigned for the “Method” 
while regressions models were run.35 
  
                                                 
35 For a detailed discussion of the four corrective measures possible through the macro, please read 
Hayes and Cia (2007) (Hayes & Cai, 2007). 





Exploded IEDs as 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1.2: ISAF Fatalities 
as Dependent Variable 
Constant 7.686 -0.17
7.666 1.072
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 56.58*** 7.102***
17.00 2.163
Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.004 0.001*
0.003 0.000
Poppy Eradication Lagged -0.005 0
0.048 0.006
Electricity Consumer Units 0.000** 0.000***
0.000 0
R-Square 0.497 0.717
Number of Cases 136 136
Constant 64.49 Constant 264.526
1007.87 849.35
Exploded IEDs 48.40** ISAF Fatalities 462.83**
25.00 200.22
Poppy Eradication Lagged 6.779 Poppy Eradication Lagged 4.830
7.307 6.448
Electricity Consumer Units -0.01 Electricity Consumer Units -0.033**
0.012 0.015
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 612 Provinces Bordering Pakistan -867.263
2672.483 2040.928
R-Square 0.433 0.584
Number of Cases 136 136
*** = 1%, ** = 5% & * = 10% Confidence Intervals
Numbers below the coefficients are Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.
Model 1: Insurgency 2006-2009
Model 2: Poppy Cultivation 2006-2009
Model 2.1: Exploded IEDs as Independent Model 2.2: ISAF Fatalities as Independent 
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Constant 4.697 Constant 1422.865
6.011 1332.686
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 6.202 ISAF Fatalities 254.18***
5.026 60.276
Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.001 Poppy Eradication Lagged 2.589
0.001 12.951
Poppy Eradication Lagged 0.039 National Solidarity Program -2.686
0.041 1.830
National Solidarity Program 0.000 Provinces Bordering Pakistan -627.051
0.008 1816.771
R-Square 0.853 R-Square 0.808
Number of Cases 102 Number of Cases 102
*** = 1%, ** = 5% & * = 10% Confidence Intervals
Numbers below the coefficients are Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.
Model 4: Poppy Cultivation 2009-
2011: With Poppy Cultivation in 
Hectares as Dependent Variable
Model 3: Insurgency 2009-2011: 
With ISAF Fatalities as Dependent 
Variable
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(Constant) -3.386 (Constant) 726.942
6.518 1889.216
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 13.105** ISAF Fatalities 199.521***
5.000 45.401
Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.003*** Poppy Eradication Lagged 2.119
0.001 2.910
Poppy Eradication Lagged 0.018* Electricity Consumer Units 0.001
0.010 0.045
National Solidarity Program 0.005 National Solidarity Program 0.972
0.014 4.124
Government School Teacher Female 0.000 Government School Teacher Female -0.168
0.003 0.957
Government School Teacher Male 0.003 Government School Teacher Male -0.574
0.004  1.128
Government School Student Female 0.000** Government School Student Female 0.004
0.000 0.047
Government School Student Male 0.000 Government School Student Male 0.003
0.000 0.035
Electricity Consumer Units 0.000** Provinces Bordering Pakistan -1626.933
0.000 1579.954
R-Square 0.957 R-Square 0.930
Adjusted R-Square 0.941 Adjusted R-Square 0.904
Number of Cases 34 Number of Cases 34
*** = 1%, ** = 5% & * = 10% Confidence Intervals
Numbers below the undesterdized coefficients are standard errors.
Model 5: Insurgency 2010: With ISAF 
Fatalities as Dependent Variable
Model 6: Poppy Cultivation: With Poppy 
Cultivation in Hectares as Dependent Variable
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Annex C 
Result of Models which Excluded Development Indicator 
 
Constant 12.655* Constant 1.313
6.72 1.013
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 52.717*** Provinces Bordering Pakistan 5.949***
15.831 2.094
Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.005 Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.001*
0.004 0.001
Poppy Eradication Lagged -0.004 Poppy Eradication Lagged 0.000
0.048 0.007
R-Square 0.490 0.697
Number of Cases 136 136
Constant -159.752 Constant -386.873
1065.633 930.249
Exploded IEDs 47.973 ISAF Fatalities 449.780
47.973 177.672
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 822.194 Provinces Bordering Pakistan -210.704
47.973 1801.837
Poppy Eradication Lagged 6.730 Poppy Eradication Lagged 4.746
47.973 6.446
R-Square 0.433 0.577
Number of Cases 136 136
*** = 1%, ** = 5% & * = 10% Confidence Intervals
Numbers below the coefficients are Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.
Insurgency 2006-2009
Exploded IEDs as Dependent Variable ISAF Fatalities as Dependent Variable 
Exploded IEDs as Independent Variable 
Poppy Cultivation 2006-2009
ISAF Fatalities as Independent Variable 




Constant 4.594*** Constant -580.436
1.376 639.317
Provinces Bordering Pakistan 6.204 ISAF Fatalities 260.962***
4.769 60.032
Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.001* Provinces Bordering Pakistan -601.584
0.001 1724.207
Poppy Eradication Lagged 0.039 Poppy Eradication Lagged 2.101
0.037 12.090
R-Square 0.853 0.802
Number of Cases 102 102
*** = 1%, ** = 5% & * = 10% Confidence Intervals
Numbers below the coefficients are Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.
Insurgency 2009-2011: With ISAF 
Fatalities as Dependent Variable
Poppy Cultivation 2009-2011: With 
Poppy Cultivation in Hectares as 
Dependent Variable
(Constant) -128.441 (Constant) 1.494
730.049 2.762
ISAF Fatalities 205.491*** Provinces Bordering Pakistan 12.581**
31.286 4.973
Provinces Bordering Pakistan -1526.976 Poppy Cultivation Lagged 0.003***
1371.492 0.001
Poppy Eradication Lagged 1.813 Poppy Eradication Lagged 0.010
2.210 0.009
R-Square 0.926 0.942
Adjusted R-Square 0.918 0.936
Number of Cases 34 34
*** = 1%, ** = 5% & * = 10% Confidence Intervals
Numbers below the undesterdized coefficients are standard errors.
Insurgency 2010: With ISAF 
Fatalities as Dependent Variable
Poppy Cultivation: With Poppy 
Cultivation in Hectares as Dependent 
Variable
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Annex D 
Table 1: Exploded IEDs and Provinces Bordering Pakistan 
 
Bordering:  Total IED’s = 5245 (71.47%), mean= 79.47, max 930 
Not bordering: Total IED’s = 2093(28.52%), mean= 15.17, max 196 
 
Year  Pearson Correlation Sig (2-tailed)  N 
2004  .585   .01   34 
2005  .656   .01   34 
2006  .568   .01   34 
2007  .605   .01   34 
2008  .534   .01   34 
2009  .429   .05   34 
2004-09 .329   .01   204 
 
Table 2: Poppy Cultivation and Provinces Bordering Pakistan 
 
Poppy cultivation (ha) and Provinces bordering PAK (2004-2009) 
Bordering: 619581 ha (71.02%)  
Not bordering: 252711 ha (28.98%)  
 
Year  Pearson Correlation Sig (2-tailed)  N 
2004  .421   .05   34 
2005  .251   .153   34 
2006  .290   .1   34 
2007  .314   .1   34 
2008  .314   .120   34 
2009  .269   .124   34 
2004-09 .276   .01   204 
Poppy cultivation (ha) and Provinces bordering PAK (2002-2011) 
Bordering: 933096 ha (72.87%) of 1280403 ha total  
Not bordering: 347307 ha (27.13%) 
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